What a second chamber can do for legislative scrutiny by Craighead, Lord Hope of
21
Amicus Curiae Issue 51 January/February 2004
A
rticle
It is a very great honour for me to have been invited to
give this, the third, lecture in this annual series in memory
of Sir William Dale which is organised by the Centre for
Legislative Studies that bears his name. As my predecessor
Lord Goldsmith remarked the last time we met, Sir
William’s career was one of tremendous scope and
achievement. His name is celebrated above all in the field
of legislative drafting, but the range of his interests was
very wide. This was borne in on me earlier this year when
we were referred in the course of a hearing of an appeal in
the House of Lordsto the first of his many published works,
The Law of the Parish Church (see Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote
with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003]
UKHL 37, [2003] 3 WLR 283). It first made its
appearance in 1932 and ran to no less than seven editions
under his own hand during his lifetime: the seventh edition
was published in 1998. It has been described as a little
gem, and he is recorded as having admitted that the fact
that it went through seven editions over 66 years under the
same authorship was probably a record. Then there was
music – everything except Wagner, as he put in his entry in
Who’s Who. But by 1977 it was legislative drafting that had
captured his attention. He wrote about its practice in the
modern Commonwealth and he compared our methods
with those in use in France, Germany and Sweden (see
Legislative Drafting: A New Approach (1977); The Modern
Commonwealth (1983); (ed) Anglo-French Statutory Drafting
(1987)).
For much of his life, of course, he was very active in this
field. He did so much to set the highest standards for those
who would follow in his footsteps.
What Sir William did not have time to do before he died
was study how legislative drafting was working out under
the devolved system in the Scottish Parliament. I should
like to devote the first part of this lecture to that topic. I
shall devote the other part to the work of the Select
Committee of the House of Lords which is charged with
scrutinising legislation emanating from the European
Union. Although the subject matter covered by these two
fields of legislation is very different both in scale and
content, there is a common theme. It is the contribution
which a Second Chamber can make to the work of a
modern legislature. We have a Second Chamber at
Westminster, but the bicameral model was rejected by
those who designed the system which has been adopted for
Holyrood. There are some who think that the Scottish
Parliament should have a Second Chamber. On the other
hand when the various options that had been suggested for
reform of the House of Lords reform were voted on in
both Houses on 4 February this year, more than a hundred
MPs voted in favour of a motion that the Second Chamber
at Westminster, the House of Lords, should be abolished
altogether. So there is a debate going on both north and
south of the border as to whether there is anything at all to
be said for having a Second Chamber in our legislatures. If
there is a good reason for having one, it must surely lie in
what a Second Chamber can do for legislative scrutiny.
THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT
Section 1 of the Scotland Act 1998 established a
unicameral Scottish Parliament. As had been proposed in
the White Paper Scotland’s Parliament (Cm 3658 (1997), the
Act was designed to provide a framework for the
Parliament, leaving it open to the Parliament itself to
develop the procedures that would best meet its purposes.
It was, of course, starting with a clean sheet. But a good
deal of thought was given to how it might operate before
the Act was passed. A consultative steering group was
established by the Secretary of State for Scotland on which
all four main political parties in Scotland, including the
Scottish National Party, were represented. Its purpose was
to consider the operational needs, working and procedures
of the Parliament with a view to the preparation of draft
standing orders for possible adoption when it convened
after the elections for its membership had been completed.
It was clear that an essential role in the legislative
process would be played by committees. As there was to be
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no Second Chamber, the entire process of scrutinising
Bills, revising their content and ensuring that they would
work in practice was to be conducted either by the
Parliament as whole or by committees. The committees
were to have the responsibility of conducting the detailed
scrutiny of these measures. They were to have power to
take evidence from interested parties as part of this process
where this was appropriate. The use of the committee
system was seen as a positive and modern development.
The expectation was that the Scottish Parliament would, by
using this system, be much closer to the people it was
designed to serve than the Westminster Parliament, which
was widely perceived to be too remote. It was also
expected that the usual rule would be that legislation about
devolved subjects in Scotland would be enacted by the
Scottish Parliament. Legislation at Westminster with regard
to devolved matters was expected be infrequent (see HC
Deb, Vol 305, cols 402–403, 28 January 1998, Donald
Dewar, Secretary of State for Scotland; SP OR, 9 June
1999, col 358, Donald Dewar, First Minister), and then
only with the agreement of the Parliament at Holyrood.
During the debate on section 28(7) of the Scotland Act,
which states that the power of the Scottish Parliament to
make laws does not affect the power of the Parliament of
the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland, the
Minister of State, Lord Sewell, announced that the
Government expected a convention to be established that
Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to
devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the
Scottish Parliament ( HL Deb, 21 Jul 1998, col 791.) The
convention which has resulted is known colloquially as the
Sewell Convention after the Minister of State, Lord Sewell,
who was responsible for it: for a detailed analysis of the
procedures and the justifications which have been given for
using it, see Noreen Burrows, This is Scotland’s Parliament;
Let Scotland’s Parliament Legislate [2002] JR 213.
The basic structure that was worked out for the passage
of a Bill through the Parliament was this. Following its
introduction a Bill was to be referred to an appropriate
committee for consideration in principle. This was to be
known as Stage 1. It was to be completed by the
submission of a report, the Stage 1 Report, for debate in
principle by the whole Parliament, equivalent to a Second
Reading debate at Westminster. The Bill was then to be
returned to the committee for further debate and detailed
scrutiny, equivalent to what is known at Westminster as the
Committee Stage. This was to be known as Stage 2. When
this stage was completed the Bill was to be presented for
debate and final approval by the whole Parliament. This
was to be known as Stage 3, combining the Report and
Third Reading debates at Westminster. It was to be the
only stage when the whole Parliament was to have an
opportunity of considering the Bill in detail. But the
opportunity for making amendments to it was to be limited
by a rule that the only amendments that could be taken
were those selected by the Presiding Officer. The whole
Parliament was, of course, to have ultimate control over the
entire process, with power to remit a Bill for further
consideration at Stage 2 if necessary.
Standing Orders were then prepared in draft and
approved by the Parliament. They provide that there are to
be eight mandatory committees: those dealing with the
basic functions of procedures, standards, finance and audit
and those dealing with equal opportunities within the
Parliament, petitions to the Parliament from members of
the public, proposals for legislation by the European Union
and subordinate legislation. But the Parliament also has
power to establish committees dealing with specific subject
areas. In the performance of its legislative function this is
where the real action lies. The specific subject areas which
were chosen for this purpose by the first Parliament
following the 1999 election were nine in number, as
follows: (1) education, culture and sport, (2) enterprise
and lifelong learning, (3) health and community care, (4)
justice and home affairs (known as justice 1 and justice 2),
(5) local government, (6) rural development, (7) social
inclusion, housing and the voluntary sector and (8)
transport and the environment. There was some
restructuring of these arrangements following the 2003
election. Health and education now have committees of
their own. Culture has been put with enterprise, the
environment has been put with rural development and
transport has been added to local government. Social
inclusion, housing and the voluntary sector has been re-
named communities. The net effect is a reduction in the
number of these committees from nine to eight.
All these committees are required by rule 6.2 of the
Standing Orders to examine such matters within their
remit as they may determine appropriate or as may be
referred to them by the Parliament. But that is not all.
They are also required by the rule to conduct inquiries into
matters falling within their remit, consider the policy of the
Scottish Executive and proposals for legislation whether
before the Scottish Parliament or the United Kingdom
Parliament, consider any European Union legislation or
any international covenants or agreements, consider the
need for the reform of the law and initiate Bills on any
competent matter.
This is a formidable list of responsibilities. Bear in mind
that the Parliament has only 129 members. The committees
have between 5 and 15 members, so every member can
expect to be heavily engaged in committee work. The Office
of the Scottish Parliamentary Council is responsible for
drafting Bills to be put before Parliament by the Executive
and the handling of all associated work on Bills as they are
working their way through the system such as the
preparation of amendments to deal with points suggested
by members or by the Executive. It is staffed by only four
Scottish Parliamentary Counsel and their seven assistants.
As for the legislative output of the Parliament, it
produced during its first term of four years 54 Executive22
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Bills, 6 Members Bills and 2 Committee Bills – a total of
62 Bills, all of which have received the Royal Assent. This
represents on average 13 Bills each year, compared to
about four each year before devolution. Then there is
delegated legislation. In 2002 17 Bills were passed by the
Parliament, but so were about 550 Scottish Statutory
Instruments. And many of the more than 4,000 Statutory
Instruments made in London that year had to be looked
at by the Subordinate Legislation Committee as they were
to apply throughout the United Kingdom including
Scotland. Then there is the huge volume of proposed
legislation by the European Union, about which I shall be
saying something in the second part of this lecture. This
too had to be scrutinised by the Parliament’s European
Committee in so far as it affected devolved matters. From
time to time legislation by the United Kingdom Parliament
by agreement with the Scottish Parliament contains
provisions relating to Scotland in devolved matters under
the Sewell Convention that Westminster would not
normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in
Scotland without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.
(It has been restated in a Memorandum of Understanding
to that effect, Cm 4806 (2000), para 13, and see also the
earlier reference to HL Deb, 21 Jul 1998, col 791) . So this
has to be taken into account as well. How is all this working
out in practice? Is it too much for a single chamber to
handle on its own?
HOW IS THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT
WORKING IN PRACTICE?
To begin with there were some impressive achievements.
The very first enactment passed by the Parliament was the
Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act
1999. It was an emergency measure, as the name suggests.
It dealt with a problem that had arisen about the legislation
relating to restricted patients, commonly known as
psychopaths, detained under the Mental Health (Scotland)
Act 1984 on grounds of public safety. Following a recent
decision in the House of Lords they could no longer be
detained under that Act, as there was no form of treatment
that was capable of alleviating or preventing any further
decline in the medical condition from which they were
suffering R v Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] 1 All ER
481, 1999 SC (HL) 17.
Stage 1 of this Bill took place on 2 September 1999, the
day after the Parliament commenced business for the first
time, and its passage was completed on 8 September 1999
when, after Stage 3 was completed, the Bill was passed by
the Parliament. It survived scrutiny by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council when it was challenged as
being outside the competence of the Parliament on Human
Rights grounds in A v The Scottish Ministers, 2001 SC (PC)
63.
Many of the Bills which were passed by the Parliament
in the first two sessions of its first four year term were
remarkably short and succinct as compared with much of
the legislation that emanates from Westminster. Overall,
there is a simplicity of style and tightness of language that
would certainly have appealed to Sir William Dale. But
there were some very important and quite complex
measures too. The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act
2000 (2000, asp 4), which has 89 sections and six
Schedules, has rightly been described as a radically
reforming Act, creating in Scots law a coherent modern
code of provisions as to decisions about the personal
welfare of adults with incapacity and the management of
their property and financial affairs (see the general note on
the Act in Current Law Statutes). And the Abolition of Feudal
Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000 (2000, asp 5), which has
77 sections and 13 Schedules, took the fundamental and
long-awaited step of abolishing the feudal system of land
tenure in Scotland and addressed all the various
consequences of doing so. These two examples were high
points in the early stages of the legislative programme, as
were the Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc Act 2000, asp
6, and the Bail, Judicial Appointments etc (Scotland) Act
2000, asp 9.
They were promoted, of course, by the Scottish
Executive with the benefit of advice in the matter of
drafting from the Scottish Law Commission from whom
these Bills originated. There was little political controversy.
They were measures that would have had to wait for a long
time in the queue for enactment at Westminster, where
there was room for only a few Scottish Bills in any one
session and much pressure to keep those Bills as short as
possible. Here we see the system of devolution at its best,
and there is nothing here that suggests that the unicameral
system was operating in any way to Scotland’s disadvantage.
But there are signs elsewhere that the system is coming
under increasing pressure and may indeed be suffering as a
result. There was, of course, always a risk that politics
would take over and demands made for the introduction of
unorthodox and populist measures which would test the
Parliament’s legislative skills to the limit and result in
legislative overload. If those who draft the measures which
are to be placed before the Parliament are to be enabled to
do their job properly decisions are needed in sufficient
time for this to be done from Ministers, and there should
be as few changes of direction as possible once the Bill has
left the draftsman’s hands and started to go through the
parliamentary process. But we live in an imperfect world,
and even the most experienced parliamentary draftsman
would admit that detailed scrutiny is essential as a Bill
works its way through the legislature. The more the first
draft is exposed to amendment the more important that
scrutiny becomes.
Experience of the present system in the Scottish
Parliament has shown that, while there is plenty of policy,
MSPs take little interest in the detail. And there is an
increasing demand for quick product from the
parliamentary draftsmen and for too much legislation, with
perhaps too few people on hand to do the job. The 23
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committee system, which was designed to provide an
opportunity for careful, informed study of all the relevant
detail, is not working as it should. Responsibility for both
initial scrutiny of a Bill at Stage 1 and detailed scrutiny at
Stage 2 rests with the same committee. At both stages this
process tends to become the focus for political debate and
point-scoring. Elected committee members lack the
independence of mind and the opportunity for detachment
and genuine self-criticism that is essential to effective
scrutiny. Not surprisingly political debate predominates
when the Bill comes before the whole Parliament at Stage
3. But the opportunity for detailed scrutiny is all but over
by that stage. If there is to be detailed scrutiny under the
present system, it has to be by the committees.
The problems which legislative overload can cause is, of
course, familiar at Westminster too. Lord Rodger of
Earlsferry, who was a government law officer for several
years before he became a judge and sat in the House of
Lords as Lord Advocate, was familiar with this problem. As
he has observed (in “The Form and Language of
Legislation” ( 1999) 18 Rechtshistoriches Journal 601, 633):
“We quite often come across sections in Acts which seem to be
badly, or at least obscurely, drafted. Equally often, harsh
words are said about the draftsmen of those sections. Here
again the blame may lie elsewhere. Problems of drafting are
often caused by some amendment which the Government has
decided to make in another part of the Bill at a late stage in
its passage through Parliament, perhaps in deference to a
point made by the Opposition or by its own back benchers.
The change may require to be made very quickly and, in the
rush, almost inevitably some consequential amendment to
another provision is missed and so the problem arises. More
interestingly perhaps, even where some difficulty with the
drafting is spotted in time to put it right, there may be good
reasons why nothing is done to cure it. Once more, the
reasons are likely to be political, to do with the need to get
the particular Bill, and indeed other Bills, through
Parliament.”
That was his experience at Westminster. There is no
reason to think that the pressures to which he refers are
any the less at Holyrood.
Two examples may be given of Bills which have suffered
as a result of these shortcomings: the Protection of Wild
Animals (Scotland) Act 2002 (asp 6) and the Land Reform
(Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 2). The Protection of Wild
Animals (Scotland) Bill was originally introduced as a
Member’s Bill to prevent wild mammals from being
hunted by dogs, an area of great controversy. Seventeen
such Bills have been introduced at Westminster since
1980. None of them has yet reached the statute book. As
one commentator has observed, the fact that the Scottish
Parliament has succeeded where Westminster has failed
will be regarded either as testimony to the new institution’s
effectiveness in taking a moral stand and translating it into
legislation, or evidence of a disquieting tendency of MSPs
to adopt populist policies at the expense of the freedoms
and liberties of a particular section of the community (see
the General Note to the Act in Current Law Statutes by Mike
Radford, School of Law, Aberdeen University).
There is no doubt that the political pressures in favour
of getting the Protection of Wild Animals Bill through the
Parliament were very great. The Rural Development
Committee, which had the responsibility of considering
the Bill in principle at Stage 1 and advising the Parliament
whether that principle should be agreed to, concluded that
the Bill as introduced suffered from significant defects. It
divided on the issue, but recommended by a majority that
it would be difficult if not impossible to amend the Bill into
a form that would adequately meet the aim of ending
cruelty to animals. It recommended that the general
principles of the Bill should not be agreed to. But its
conclusion was rejected after a full debate by the
Parliament, and the Bill was returned to the committee for
detailed deliberation under Stage 2. The Bill received the
Royal Assent on 15 May 2002. Even before it was brought
into force on 1 August 2002 its validity was being
challenged in the courts. In Adams v The Scottish Ministers,
2003 SLT 366 a petition for judicial review was brought in
the Court of Session by a number of people and
organisations in Scotland connected with fox hunting who
were aggrieved by the prohibition of an activity in which
they had previously engaged. Their petition was dismissed
on 31 July 2002, but that decision is under appeal and it
seems likely that arguments about the Act’s validity will
continue for some time. Another challenge which was
brought by members of the Berwickshire Hunt and others
challenging the competence of the Scottish Parliament to
legislate on this issue at all was dismissed on 20 June 2003
(Whaley v The Lord Advocate, 20 June 2003, unreported). In
the course of his judgment the Lord Ordinary, Lord
Brodie, said that the fact that the Parliament had only one
chamber and not two did not affect the powers of the
court, which could not act as an upper chamber.
The Land Reform (Scotland) Bill was another measure
of a similar character. The aim of this Bill, which has no
counterpart in England and Wales, was to give rural
communities the right to buy land when it comes up for
sale and give the public a right of access to all land. Here
too radical policies were being promoted by MSPs which
were resisted by a significant body of public opinion on the
ground that it affected their rights and liberties. On this
occasion there was no disagreement between the relevant
committee and the Parliament. But the scrutiny of the Bill
by the Justice Committee at a series of meetings at which
evidence was taken seems to have fallen well short of the
expectations of those who had understood that the
committee system would enable people from all walks of
life to be given a proper hearing, with their evidence heard
by cross-party groups who would cross-question them to
ensure a fair and equitable outcome. Magnus Linklater, a
distinguished journalist and regular commentator on the24
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work of the Parliament, was moved to say in the Scotland on
Sunday (1 December 2002, p 18) after reading through the
reports of the meetings held by this committee:
“As I began to read, I was struck by two things – first of all
the blatant, and often self-confessed bias of its members
against landowners, farmers and their representatives. Second,
the almost wilful refusal to accept evidence which challenged
the thrust of the Bill. Those who lobbied for open access to
land, or who campaigned for wider distribution of property
were listened to with respect and deference, and often called
back to give further evidence. Those who sought to defend the
rights of property-owners were exposed to truculent and often
offensive questioning. The net result is a Bill that has gone
further in the direction of radical change than was ever
envisaged by the late Donald Dewar when he outlined its
purposes – but without the stringent analysis of the legal
implications that should have accompanied it.”
There is another area of work affecting devolved matters
that is in danger of receiving less attention from the
Scottish Parliament than it should have if the Parliament is
to do its work properly. This is legislation, both primary
and delegated, affecting Scotland which is made under the
Sewell Convention at Westminster. It was widely assumed
that one of the consequences of devolution would be that
Parliament at Westminster would no longer legislate on
devolved matters, or at least if it did so this would be only
in exceptional and limited circumstances. But this has not
happened. It has been found to be convenient in practice
to allow Westminster to continue to legislate in devolved
matters by the use of Sewell motions when it is legislating
for England and Wales in the same subject matter. The
frequency with which this occurs, and the fact that this is
the product of agreements between executives rather than
between parliaments, has attracted criticism (see Noreen
Burrows, This is Scotland’s Parliament; Let Scotland’s Parliament
Legislate [2002] JR 213; Report of the Select Committee of
the House of Lords on the Constitution: Inter-Institutional
Relations in the United Kingdom (2nd Report, HL Paper
28, Session 2002-2003)).
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2003 (2002, c 29) provides
a good example of this practice. The Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (2002, c 41) provides
another. The purpose of the Proceeds of Crime Act was to
reform the law relating to the removal of the proceeds of
crime from those convicted of certain crimes. The policy
to which it seeks to give effect applies to the whole of the
United Kingdom, so it made sense to include the Scottish
provisions in it. Another reason for preferring to legislate
in this way in areas such as these, which are particularly
sensitive to objection on human rights grounds, is that it
removes the risk of a Bill being found to be outside
competence after enactment. The Scottish Parliament does
not enjoy parliamentary sovereignty: under the Scotland
Act 1998, s 29(4) it cannot pass measures which are
incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights. It is not just that the Bill would have to be immune
from challenge at the outset. Amendments which might
have the effect of taking a Bill outside its competence
would have to be rejected too. As for delegated legislation,
Professor Colin Reid has warned that the concentration on
politics in Edinburgh should not mask the true significance
of powers being exercised in London where more law for
Scotland is made than is made by the Scottish Executive
(Colin T Reid, “Who makes Scotland’s Law? Delegated
Legislation under the Devolution Arrangements” (2002) 6
Edinburgh Law Review 380).
The Scottish Parliament has a mandatory subordinate
legislation committee which has the functions of the
equivalent committees at Westminster, but these functions
do not extend to the scrutiny of United Kingdom statutory
instruments. There is also some room for doubt as to
whether Scottish delegated legislation itself is as yet being
adequately scrutinised: for a detailed examination of the
early operation of the procedures of this committee, see
Chris Himsworth, “Subordinate legislation in the Scottish
Parliament” (2002) 6 Edinburgh Law Review 356.
There is reason to be concerned about the extent to
which these and similar measures are receiving appropriate
scrutiny. The contrary argument is that Scottish MPs will
scrutinise the legislation on behalf of members of the
Scottish Parliament. But the ability of Ministers in both
Houses at Westminster to deal with matters affecting
Scotland in the devolved areas has been much reduced
since devolution. This tends to affect the amount of
attention which the provisions relating to Scotland receive
during debates in these Houses. There is not much point
in engaging in debate or asking detailed questions about
Scottish matters if the Minister at the Despatch Box is
unable to deal with these issues and has to refer them back
to Ministers of the Scottish Executive in Edinburgh.
Suggestions that the Procedures Committee of the Scottish
Parliament should be asked to review the procedures for
obtaining the Parliament’s consent to Westminster
legislation have, so far, gone unheeded (see Alan Page and
Andrea Batey, “Scotland’s Other Parliament: Westminster
Legislation about Devolved Matters in Scotland since
Devolution” [2002] Public Law 510, 522).
Proposals that legislation that has been proposed for
England and Wales on gender recognition and same-sex
registered partnerships should be extended to Scotland by
adding Scottish provisions onto each Bill in pursuance of a
Sewell motion, with the result that these issues will be dealt
with for Scotland at Westminster, has added further fuel to
this debate (Editorial, “The Executive abdicates
responsibility”, 2003 SCOLAG LJ 138 (August 2003).
THE CASE FOR A SECOND CHAMBER IN
THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT
It is hardly surprising that the unicameral system in what
is, after all, still a very youthful legislature should fall short
of the high standards which we have come to expect by way 25
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of Parliamentary scrutiny. All the debates on legislation,
both in committee and before the whole Parliament, are
conducted in public. This means that they are conducted
under the constant gaze of the press, which is very active in
its reporting of what goes on and often highly critical.
Government is by coalition, there is a strong socialist and
green element and the largest opposition party is the
Scottish National Party which tolerates devolution but sees
it only as a step towards complete independence from the
UK. The main concern of politicians in that environment
is with their public image. Nice points about the precise
wording of legislation have little appeal.
Public debate on the idea that there should be a second
chamber began with an article by Duncan Hamilton, an
SNP member of the Scottish Parliament, which was
published in the Scotsman newspaper on 31 March 2002
under the heading “The choice facing Holyrood: reform or
stagnate”. One of the issues which he addressed in this
article was the way the Parliament was making law. As he
pointed out, the Constitutional Steering Group which
drew up the framework for the new Parliament put great
emphasis on a new process for law making. It was to be
inclusive and transparent and the work of the
parliamentary committees was to be at the core of decision
making. But his experience of the system in practice,
especially during the passage through the system of the
Protection of Wild Animals (Scotland) Bill, had led him to
question whether the present system contained the
necessary checks and balances to ensure robust and
effective scrutiny of legislation. He said that the status of
committee recommendations, which had been rejected in
the case of that Bill by the whole Parliament, had to be
bolstered or thought be given to the creation of a second
chamber if Parliament was to fulfil its task of passing good
law.
Debate on the issue of a second chamber was further
excited by an interview with the previous Presiding Officer
of the Scottish Parliament, Sir David Steel, which was
published by the Scotsman on 26 December 2002. He said
that he had, in the light of experience, come to favour a
system whereby a Bill would receive further scrutiny by a
small part-time, wholly appointed second chamber – a
panel of “wise men” (a panel of “wise persons” would be
the more politically correct phrase) – after it had been
passed by the Parliament. He saw its sole function as that
of revising all proposed legislation after it had completed
its passage through the elected legislature. This would
provide an opportunity for detailed consideration in a less
politically-pressurised environment from a more politically
detached and perhaps better informed perspective, free of
party whips and leadership control of the career
development of the elected members. His suggestion was
that such a system would offer the prospect, at least from
a technical point of view, of an improvement in the quality
of legislation emanating from the Parliament. Similar views
were expressed by Sir lay Campbell of Succoth in his reply
to a survey about voting intentions in the elections to the
Scottish Parliament in May 2003 (published in The Scottish
Review, May 2003, p 27).
Sir David Steel’s observations were not well received by
the elected members. This was hardly surprising. It was
misconstrued, and misreported, as a suggestion that there
should be a second chamber – the very thing that he had
been careful to avoid. In a letter to the Times which was
published on 30 January 2003 he denied that he had been
proposing a Scottish version of the House of Lords. But the
idea that there should be a second chamber has received
further support from a highly respected academic lawyer,
Professor Hector MacQueen of the University of
Edinburgh (essay in The Scotsman, 11 March 2003, p 9; see
also What Future for Scotland? Policy Options for Devolution,
published on 13 March 2003 by the Policy Institute).
Professor MacQueen points out that, although
unicameral systems are the norm in the Nordic countries,
bicameralism is common in democracies in the English-
speaking world and that it has been adopted in Germany,
France and Italy. It provides an opportunity for second
thoughts. Is not unknown at sub-state level, as state
legislatures in the United States and in Australia are
typically bicameral. The critical issues which he has
identified lie in the detail. They are the manner of
appointment to the second chamber and the extent of the
powers that it would have in relation to the rest of the
Parliament and the executive. He has taken the idea
beyond the panel of wise persons that Sir David Steel has
suggested. He suggests that it should be no larger than 50
persons, of whom perhaps half might be elected in some
way or other and include territorial or regional
representatives, that it should not necessarily be full-time,
that it should not be controlled or controllable by any party
or combination of parties, that it should have the power to
require reconsideration but generally not to prevent the
passage of legislation from the other chamber and that it
should have other functions such as the initiation of non-
contentious legislation, constitutional and other public
interest scrutiny of legislation and of other public actions
and decision-making. To that list he added as an important
consideration relations between the Parliament and other
institutions of government in the UK and the EU.
Although he did not say so in terms, I believe that this
would provide an opportunity for the more effective
scrutiny of proposed legislation by the European Union
and of legislation in devolved areas which is being handled
at Westminster. These are important areas of work where
the Parliament in its present form appears to be falling
short of what is required.
There is no doubt that the introduction of a second
chamber into the present system in Scotland would be
contentious. As Professor MacQueen observed, the case
for the functions often performed by second chambers as a
necessary element is really uncontroversial. The question
whether one is needed in Scotland is the question which26
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excites controversy. Primary legislation would be required
to amend the Scotland Act, and it would have to be
preceded by a period of consultation. Politically, this may
prove to be too much a mountain to climb for the time
being. Although the late Donald Dewar said that
devolution was a process, not an event, review of the
present structure risks opening up much wider and more
fundamental issues. The whole system is likely to remain
precarious so long as the Scottish National Party continues
to command a high level of support among the electorate.
But the arguments in favour of its introduction are, I
believe, compelling. Properly handled, such a reform
would be likely to produce a marked improvement in the
quality of the work done by the Parliament.
SCRUTINY OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION AT
WESTMINSTER
As everyone knows, the primary responsibility for
legislation in this country rests with Parliament. It is not
the primary responsibility of the executive. What then are
we to make of legislation that emanates from the EU? EU
legislation is made by the Council of Ministers. National
parliaments have no part to play in that process. The
Council of Ministers, as the name suggest, is composed of
ministers drawn from the member states – members of the
executive. Moreover, the content of a regulation or a
directive is settled when it emerges from Brussels. It then
has to be implemented in accordance with the obligations
imposed on all member states by Article 234 of the Treaty.
So it is a matter of great importance that those who
prepare this legislation on behalf of the EU should be
subject to scrutiny. As legislation is a matter for Parliament,
there has to be role in this process for Parliament. That
role is to scrutinise the proposed measure before assent is
given to it to ensure, so far as possible, that it is appropriate
that the citizens of our country should be required to
comply with it.
The scrutiny of EU legislation at Westminster is
conducted by both Houses of Parliament. EU documents
are deposited in Parliament along with an explanatory
memorandum prepared by the relevant department of the
UK Government. This memorandum sets out the
government’s views on the policy implications of the
proposal and the timetable for its consideration by the
Council. These documents are then examined separately
by two committees, the European Scrutiny Committee in
the House of Commons and the Select Committee on the
European Union in the House of Lords. Where necessary
the committees then comment on these documents by way
of a report to the House or a letter to the Minister. The
word “scrutiny” is interpreted by the House of Lords
Select Committee in its broadest sense, namely a process
of examination and analysis of the proposals and actions of
those responsible for the government with a view to
ensuring that they are accountable for their actions to
Parliament (Review of Scrutiny of European Legislation (1st
Report, Session 2002–03, HL Paper 15), para 8). It has
been defined for their purposes by the House of Commons
Scrutiny Committee in these terms:
“To ensure that members are informed of EU proposals likely
to affect the United Kingdom, to provide a source of
information and analysis for the public and to ensure that the
House and the European Scrutiny Committee, and through
them other organisations and individuals, have opportunities
to make Ministers aware of their views on EU proposals, seek
to influence Ministers and hold Ministers to account.”
The key to the system in the House of Lords is a scrutiny
reserve resolution which was passed by the House of Lords
on 6 December 1999 (the full text of this resolution is set
out in Appendix 3 to the Report). It is intended to ensure
that Ministers do not agree to EU legislation in the Council
unless and until the House’s scrutiny of it is complete. It
gives the House an opportunity to influence the position
which the Government is adopting on the proposal in
negotiation with other member states of the Community. It
states that no Minister of the Crown should give agreement
in the Council to any proposal for European Community
legislation on which the European Union Committee has
not completed its scrutiny or on which the Committee has
made a report to the House for debate but on which the
debate has not taken place. In other words, the effect of the
resolution is to bar Ministers from giving agreement in
Council to any proposal which has not been cleared from
scrutiny. Ministers can override the reserve if they consider
that for special reasons agreement should be given to it, but
they must give an explanation when they do so. A similar
scrutiny reserve resolution operates in the House of
Commons.
The committees of the two Houses differ in the methods
which they adopt when they are carrying out this process.
The House of Lords Committee has, in addition to the
main committee, six sub-committees whose members have
expertise in six different policy areas: economic and
financial affairs, environment and agriculture, law and
institutions, social affairs and so on. Under the current
arrangements, which will be brought to an end with the
setting up of the proposed new Supreme Court, a serving
Lord of Appeal in Ordinary serves for three years as
chairman of the sub-committee on law and institutions:
my immediate predecessors as chairman were Lords Slynn
of Hadley and Lord Hoffmann and my successor is Lord
Scott of Foscote. About 70 members of the House serve on
these various committees, so a very wide range of
knowledge and experience is brought to bear on their
work. As the various documents are deposited for scrutiny
they are sifted by the Chairman who, having examined the
document and the explanatory memorandum, decides
whether it should be referred to one of the sub-
committees for examination or should be cleared at once
from scrutiny. The purpose of the sift is to ensure that the
Committee focuses its attention on significant documents. 27
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About a quarter of all the documents deposited in
Parliament are sifted to the sub-committees. The number
of documents deposited has been increasing steadily year
after year and is now about 1,400. So about 385
documents find their way to the House of Lords sub-
committees each year for detailed scrutiny. The House of
Commons Scrutiny Committee does not examine the
documents on their merits, it has no sub-committee and
there is no sift. It considers them all and reports to the
House whether they are legally or politically important and
thus worthy of debate. If there is a debate it normally takes
place in a European Standing Committee or, occasionally,
on the floor of the House of Commons. The debate is
responded to by the relevant Minister. The Scrutiny
Committee may however correspond with Ministers if
more information is required before a decision is taken as
to whether there should be a debate. The scrutiny reserve
remains in operation while that information is being
sought.
The scrutiny reserve system thus plays a vital role in this
process. Its purpose is to ensure, except in special cases,
that the process of scrutiny is completed in both Houses
before the proposed measure is agreed to in Council by the
relevant Minister. It does not require the Government to
agree with the views expressed by either House, nor does
it require a Minister to obtain a mandate from Parliament
before negotiating a position in Council on behalf of the
Government. Nevertheless a great deal of effort is
expended in order to ensure that the scrutiny is as effective
as possible. There is, after all, a clear constitutional
purpose in this exercise. If it is to serve this purpose it
should include the following: (a) gathering together
relevant material with a view to informing the House and
the public about what is being proposed, (b) drawing
attention to significant issues and making
recommendations on them for consideration by Ministers,
(c) subjecting the draft text to detailed analysis by exposing
difficulties and proposing amendments as part of the
process of law-making.
In combination the EU Committees of both Houses
provide a valuable check on the work done by Ministers in
this area. But the strength of their contribution lies in the
different ways in which they operate. The selective and
detailed approach of the House of Lords Committee and
its various sub-committees is widely admired throughout
the EU. It has helped to create a culture in which the
government accepts that it has to justify the decisions
which it takes on our behalf in the Council of Ministers.
This in its turn has done much to enhance the reputation
generally, and among the institutions of the EU in
particular, of the system of scrutiny of EU legislation at
Westminster.
CONCLUSION
The importance of parliamentary scrutiny cannot be
overstated. The quality, legality and democratic legitimacy
of the legislation by which our activities are increasingly
being regulated is a matter of concern to us all. Our
Parliaments would be failing in their duty if they were
unable to ensure that the legislation which they enact
measures up to these requirements.
That is the context in which the contribution that
second chambers can make should be judged. One often
hears criticisms that the second chamber at Westminster is
undemocratic and that it exists simply as an obstacle to the
passage of measures that have the support in the other,
elected chamber of the majority. Similar criticisms are
made of the suggestion that a second chamber should be
introduced into the Scottish Parliament. But they divert
attention from the only relevant question, which relates to
the functions which a second chamber is designed to serve.
That question is whether the second chamber can add
value to the process of legislative scrutiny. That is the
starting point for an examination of its constitutional
legitimacy and its utility. I believe that the reputation of the
Westminster Parliament would be seriously weakened if it
were to be deprived of the services of its second chamber,
and that the quality of the work done by Scottish
Parliament would be enhanced if it were to acquire one.
Lord Hope of Craighead
